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Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms. 
Interpretations of Nuclear Energy in the British and 
West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 
1955-1964 
Holger Nehring∗ 
Abstract: Most environmental historians argue that an 
awareness of the dangers of nuclear energy emerged only 
during the 1970s. Conversely, they have noted a “blindness 
towards the apocalypse” (Günter Anders) during the 1950s 
and early 1960s. This article examines the perceptions of 
the dangers and possible benefits connected with nuclear 
energy within the protests against nuclear weapons in Brit-
ain and West Germany during the late 1950s and early 
1960s in order to differentiate this assessment. Especially in 
the Federal Republic, discussions about the military use of 
nuclear energy prefigured the tropes which were to resur-
face in the environmental movements of the 1970s and 
1980s. The civilian use of nuclear energy was, by contrast, 
increasingly seen as the harbinger of peace.  
Introduction 
Most environmental historians argue that an awareness of the dangers of nu-
clear energy emerged only during the 1970s. Conversely, they have noted a 
“blindness towards the apocalypse” during the 1950s and early 1960s.1 This 
article widens the perspective of environmental history in order to come to a 
more differentiated assessment. It examines the perceptions of the dangers and 
possible benefits connected with nuclear energy within the protests against nu-
clear weapons in Great Britain and West Germany during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In this period, public discourse as well as discussions within the 
                                                 
∗  Address all communications to: Holger Nehring, St. Peter’s College, New Inn Hall Street, 
Oxford OX1 2DL, United Kingdom. E-mail: holger.nehring@history.ox.ac.uk. 
1  The term is from Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, vol. 1 (Munich, 1956) 
(cf. the chapter “Über die Bombe und die Wurzeln unserer Apokalypse-Blindheit”). 
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movements in both countries regarded the dangers emanating from nuclear 
energy as stemming primarily from its military use. The civilian use of nuclear 
energy was, by contrast, increasingly viewed as the harbinger of peace. This 
shows that both movements were part of the technological discourses at the 
time, rather than opposed to them. We can only rarely find a general rejection 
of modernity in the two movements and only very little romantic protest.2 In-
stead, we encounter a wholehearted embrace of modern society, coupled with 
an awareness of its problems.3 Within contemporary discussions, “the atom!” 
generally served as a symbol for modern society and for a good future. This 
enthusiasm for science served as a powerful argument at a time when the 
movements were accused of contributing to public hysteria.4 This article thus 
confirms analyses of the paradoxical nature of debates at the time.5  
Despite these general similarities, each movement had specific national 
characteristics. Due to West Germany’s geographical position on the frontline 
of the Cold War and its recent experience of utter destruction during World 
War II, protesters in West Germany, much more than their British counterparts, 
felt that the dangers coming from the military use of nuclear energy were im-
minent. They conceptualized these dangers in much more catastrophic terms. 
The significance of these rhetorical differences goes beyond the history of these 
movements. Social movements, as “informal networks, based […] on shared 
beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about […] conflictual issues,” provide a 
forum for societies to communicate about themselves.6 Without communica-
tion, environmental problems do not possess any social relevance.7 The debates 
within the social movements thus highlight popular perceptions of the problems 
connected with nuclear energy in Britain and West Germany more generally.8  
                                                 
2  This is the argument in Ulrich Linse, Ökopax und Anarchie. Eine Geschichte der ökolo-
gischen Bewegungen in Deutschland (Munich, 1986) and Meredith Veldman, Fantasy, the 
Bomb, and the Greening of Britain. Romantic Protest, 1945-1980 (Cambridge, 1994). 
3  This was a feature of previous discussions on technological issues. Cf., for example, Uwe 
Fraunholz, Motorphobia: Anti-Automobiler Protest in Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik 
(Göttingen, 2000). Peter Fritzsche has taken this to be a characteristic of modernity per se. 
Cf. his A Nation of Fliers. German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, 
1992), pp. 218-219. 
4  For examples cf. The Macmillan Diaries. The Cabinet years, 1950-1957, ed. and with an 
introduction by Peter Catterall (London, 2004), p. 303; and Konrad Adenauer, Reden: 1917 
– 1967. Eine Auswahl, ed. by Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 357. 
5  Joachim Radkau, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft, 1945-1975. Verdrängte 
Alternativen in der Kerntechnik und der Ursprung der modernen Kontroverse (Reinbek, 
1983), p. 92. 
6  Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements. An Introduction (Oxford, 1999), 
p. 16. 
7  This interpretation follows Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theoretical approach. Cf. his Ökolo-
gische Kommunikation (Opladen, 1986), p. 63. More generally cf. his Protest. Systemtheo-
rie und soziale Bewegungen, ed. by Kai-Uwe Hellmann (Frankfurt, 1996). 
8  Luhmann, Ökologische Kommunikation, p. 91 and Kenneth E. Boulding, Ecodynamics. A 
New Theory of Societal Evolution (Beverly Hills, 1978), p. 20. 
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This article seeks to modify previous interpretations which have come to 
dominate contemporary environmental history.9 While studies on the percep-
tions of the dangers of the military uses of nuclear energy exist for the 1950s 
and 1960s, scholars of the environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s 
have rarely engaged with that research and realized that many of the parameters 
of the environmental discourse, particularly its apocalyptic vocabulary, origi-
nated in the debates about nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and early 1960s.10 
Instead, they have advanced arguments based on the implicit or explicit adop-
tion of the notion of a “1950s’ syndrome”, an interpretation that highlights a 
general lack of awareness of environmental problems during the period of 
increased environmental pollution in the wake of growing industrial output and 
economic growth.11 By taking the high level of awareness during the 1970s and 
the 1980s as a yardstick, proponents of these interpretations tend to dismiss as 
insufficient the knowledge concerning the dangers of nuclear energy that ex-
isted in the 1950s and early 1960s. This is often due to their rather narrow 
perspective on environmental movements, which, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
were primarily concerned with nature protection.12 After outlining the develop-
ment of the anti-nuclear weapons movements from the mid-1950s to the early 
1960s, this article will analyze the debates about the dangers that nuclear weap-
ons posed and then examine the hopes connected with the “peaceful atom.” 
Imagining Nuclear Dangers 
Both the British and the West German movements started as protests against 
nuclear weapons tests in the mid-1950s and the radiation emanating from them. 
                                                 
9  An exception is Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Tschernobyl, 26. April 1986. Die ökologische 
Herausforderung (Munich, 1998), pp. 211-212. More generally, cf. the critical evaluation 
(with the relevant literature) by Frank Uekötter, “Umweltbewegung zwischen dem Ende der 
nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft und der ‘ökologischen Wende’: Ein Literaturbericht,” 
Historical Social Research 28 (2003), 1/2, pp. 270-289, and his Naturschutz im Aufbruch. 
Eine Geschichte des Naturschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1945-1980 (Frankfurt and New  
York, 2004). 
10  Most notably, the study by Ilona Stölken-Fitschen, Atombombe und Geistesgeschichte. Eine 
Studie der fünfziger Jahre aus deutscher Sicht (Baden-Baden, 1995) and the short piece by 
Wilfried von Bredow, “Der Atomdiskurs im Kalten Krieg (1945-1962),” in Michael Sael-
wski (ed.), Das nukleare Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 91-101. 
11  Cf. Christian Pfister (ed.), Das 1950er Syndrom. Der Weg in die Verschwendungsgesell-
schaft (Bern, 1994).  
12  The term “environment” was not used in discussions of the 1950s and 1960s. Cf. Raymond 
H. Dominick III, The Environmental Movement in Germany. Prophets and Pioneers, 1871-
1971 (Bloomington, 1992) and Axel Goodbody (ed.), The Culture of German Environmen-
talism: Anxieties, Vision, Realities (New York and Oxford, 2002). On British environ-
mental history, cf. John Sheail, An Environmental History of Twentieth-Century Britain 
(Basingstoke, 2002). 
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In Britain, the first protests against nuclear bomb tests and bases took place in 
the early 1950s, with the pacifist Peace Pledge Union at the centre. When pub-
lic discussions about Britain’s production of hydrogen bombs began in 1954, 
the Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign was founded as a novel pressure 
group. 1957 saw the formation of two more groups. The Direct Action Com-
mittee (DAC) was formed to protest against British H-bomb tests in the Pacific 
with Greenpeace-like tactics; its activities paralleled those of the more moder-
ate National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests, formed in 
February 1957. This Committee merged into the newly-founded Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in early 1958. CND campaigned for a policy of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament. In autumn 1960, a more radical group around 
the philosopher Bertrand Russell and his assistant Ralph Schoenman left CND 
and founded the Committee of 100.13 
In West Germany, public awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons e-
merged at around the same time as in Britain, although organizations were 
formed much later. As in Britain, the West German movement had its roots in 
concerns about the dangers of nuclear weapons tests. Initially, however, it was 
restricted to scientists who, in the Mainau Declaration of 1955, and, more fa-
mously, in the Göttingen Declaration of April 1957, warned of underestimating 
the dangers of nuclear weapons. While these sentiments had been translated 
into protests in Britain in the mid-1950s, no major protests emerged in West 
Germany at this time. This was primarily due to the staunchly anti-communist 
climate in the Federal Republic. Although anti-communism permeated both the 
British and the West German political cultures, it had a more immediate impor-
tance in the Federal Republic. Due to division and competition between the two 
German states, the “Cold Civil War” drew the boundaries of the “say-able” and 
the “do-able” much more clearly there than it did in Britain.14 In early 1958, the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions launched a Campaign 
against Atomic Death when the Adenauer government planned to acquire nu-
clear-capable equipment for the German Army. A new movement emerged af-
ter the SPD abandoned the Campaign in the wake of their programmatic 
changes. In 1960, a small group of the Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons 
Opponents demonstrated for the first time in northern Germany. From 1961 on, 
there were marches all over the country. In September 1962, the movement 
changed its name to “Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents – Cam-
paign for Disarmament.”15 
                                                 
13  The standard work on this topic is Richard Taylor, Against the Bomb. The British Peace 
Movement 1958-1965 (Oxford, 1988). 
14  Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD. Communism and Anti-Communism in West Ger-
many, 1945-1956 (Oxford, 1997), p. 294. For one of many examples of West German in-
terpretations, cf. “Gesteuerte Atomhysterie,” Rheinischer Merkur, April 9, 1954. 
15  The standard works on the West German developments are: Hans Karl Rupp, Außerparla-
mentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer (Cologne, 1984) and Karl A. Otto, Vom Os-
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Throughout the period from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, a complex in-
terplay between Cold War and World War II experiences influenced the de-
bates about the dangers of nuclear fall-out and of nuclear weapons in both 
countries. The combination of higher perceptions of threat in the Cold War and 
the catastrophic Second World War experiences meant that these discussions 
were more salient in the Federal Republic than in Britain. For West Germans, 
nuclear weapons threatened to repeat and amplify the experiences of total war. 
The relative neglect of this fundamental issue in British protests had also to do 
with the more directly political focus of the British campaign. From the begin-
ning of the protests in the 1950s, the British protesters campaigned for a change 
of foreign and defense policy that would ban the tests and take unilateral steps 
to get rid of nuclear weapons, while the West German discussions were much 
more generally concerned with the dangers coming from tests. Initially, West 
German public statements emphasized less the elements of an alternative for-
eign and defense policy and more the survival of the German nation – hence 
the rather gloomy title of the West German Campaign against Atomic Death as 
opposed to the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Only after the SPD 
had abandoned the Campaign by late 1959 did a movement emerge which con-
cerned itself more with presenting an alternative foreign policy. With this shift 
in emphasis, along with the receding World War II experiences and with the 
Cold War détente, the issue of the dangers of nuclear weapons lost importance 
in German public discussions as well. The debates took place at a time when 
“security” in general was one of the key words in the domestic political dis-
course in both countries.16 Due to its seeming insecurities, nuclear deterrence 
became a creeping atomic war for many activists, particularly as test explosions 
would already harm people in peace time and thus turn peace into war.17 
Both the British and the West German populations only slowly became 
aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons. After World War Two, the destruc-
tive powers of nuclear weapons were apparent, but, given the closeness of the 
World War experiences and despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki, people still per-
ceived the threat of nuclear weapons along rather abstract lines.18 Only the 
development and testing of hydrogen bombs by the United States, and, later, by 
Britain and the Soviet Union, drove the dangers of nuclear energy home to an 
increasing number of the British and West German populations and led to the 
first, rather muted, protests in early 1954.19 To most Britons and West Ger-
                                                                                                      
termarsch zur APO. Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesre-
publik 1960-1970 (Frankfurt, 1982). 
16  Cf. Hans Braun, “Das Streben nach ‘Sicherheit’ in den 50er Jahren: Soziale und politische 
Ursachen und Erscheinungsweisen,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 18 (1978), pp. 279-306. 
17  Wolfgang Bartels, “Der militärische Mißbrauch des Atoms,” Gewerkschaftliche Monatshef-
te 9 (1958), pp. 193-197. 
18  Cf. Stölken-Fitschen, Atombombe und Geistesgeschichte, p. 48. 
19  “Atombomben,” Der Spiegel, December 25, 1950. Cf. auch: “Apokalypse,” Die Neue 
Zeitung, February 16, 1950; “Selbstmord in temporärem Wahnsinn. Physikalische Grundla-
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mans, however, an uneasy balance between awe and fear, an admiration of the 
aesthetics of the atomic mushrooms and of the power inherent in “the atom,” as 
people perceived it, went side by side. It is characteristic of this mixture that 
the Bikini Atoll, the location of the American tests, gave its name to a piece of 
clothing, and that contemporary publications showed beauties bathing in biki-
nis side by side with the mushroom clouds.20 
It was probably one accident more than any other that alerted the British and 
West German populations to the dangers of radiation. The Japanese fishing 
vessel Lucky Dragon had sailed into the testing area in the Pacific Ocean, leav-
ing its crew severely radiated.21 It had now become obvious that it was impos-
sible to isolate the dangers of nuclear weapons. British and West German 
newspapers and movement activists interpreted the incident in ways which 
highlighted the fact that nuclear energy was now out of control, that human 
beings, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, had released a power that they could no 
longer control.22 It was only through luck that a catastrophe could be averted.23 
What was new in these discussions was that the perceived threat from these 
weapons was no longer merely connected to the use of the weapons in wartime, 
but also referred to health hazards in times of peace.24 Often, the rhetoric re-
vealed a rather religious understanding of the powers of nature that can be 
found in other areas of the environmental discourse of the 1950s and in the 
broadly pessimistic tone of the intellectual discourses of the time.25 Many state-
ments highlighted the bombs’ “demonic power”; some classified them as “apoc-
alyptic weapons.”26 Accordingly, their further development was regarded as 
“blasphemy,” “temptation of the Creator,” and “human hubris.”27 They pointed 
                                                                                                      
gen, Aufbau und Wirkung der Wasserstoff-Atombombe - Vorbote des großen Weltenbran-
des,“ Das Echo der Woche, March 3, 1950. 
20  Cf. Eckhard Siepmann (comp.), Bikini. Die fünfziger Jahre. Kalter Krieg und Capri-Sonne. 
Fotos-Texte-Comics-Analysen (Reinbek, 1983). 
21  On reactions in Japan and the United States cf. Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind. The 
Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-1960 (New York, 1978), pp. 7-8 and George H. Gallup, The 
Gallup International Public Opinion Polls. Great Britain 1937-1975. Vol. 1: 1937-1964 
(New York, 1976), p. 320. 
22  “Im Bann planetarischer Gefahren,” Die Welt, March 24, 1954; “Das entsetzliche Ding von 
Bikini,” Weser Kurier, March 26, 1954; “Frieden durch Schrecken,” Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, March 30, 1954. On reactions in Britain, cf. Christopher Driver, The Dis-
armers. A Study in Protest (London, 1964), pp. 26-27. 
23  “Die Katastrophe von Bikini,” Rheinischer Merkur, April 2, 1954. 
24  “Irrtum auf Bikini,” Die Gegenwart, March 27, 1954. 
25  Jens-Ivo Engels, “Vom Subjekt zum Objekt. Naturbild und Naturkatastrophen in der Ge-
schichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in: Dieter Groh, Michael Kempe and Franz 
Mauelshagen (eds.), Naturkatastrophen. Beiträge zu ihrer Deutung, Wahrnehmung und 
Darstellung in Text und Bild von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2003), pp. 
119-142, here pp. 122-134; and Paul Nolte, Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft. 
Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 2000), pp. 273-318. 
26  “Papierstrategie und H-Bomben,” Westdeutsches Tageblatt, March 25, 1954. 
27  “Die Atomwaffe,” Hamburger Abendblatt, April 10, 1954; “Im Bann planetarischer Ge-
fahren,” Die Welt, March 24, 1954. 
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out that it was important to use the powers of nature, but not to change them 
and not to search for the infinite.28 
The growing perceptions of the dangers of radioactivity in the air increas-
ingly found expression in worries about radioactive fall-out from the bomb 
tests in the Pacific reaching Europe and, especially, about Strontium-90 in 
milk. It was particularly in the debates on Strontium-90 in milk that both socie-
ties thematized their worries about the future. Pregnant women and newborn 
babies were singled out as being particularly endangered. The growing move-
ments in both countries tried to tap these fears of imperilled nationhood.29 They 
alerted the British and West German populations to dangers from radioactive 
rain. These worries, which attest to the high awareness of the German popula-
tion at the time, included fears about climate change induced by radioactivity 
set free through test explosions. In June 1956, 59% of the West German popu-
lation argued that bad weather conditions were due to high levels of radioactiv-
ity in the air. By October, that number had climbed to 68%.30 One commentator 
close to the early anti-nuclear weapons movement in the Federal Republic 
argued that “while the North of the Federal Republic was affected by a week-
long drought, fertile cultures and homesteads in North Hesse, Thuringia and 
Lower Saxony drowned in continuous rainfalls. Since the beginning of man-
kind there have not been such weather catastrophes. … But with the Flood 
came the radioactive plague.” 31 Some more comical fears included suspicions 
in the West German population that white female underwear drying on a rope 
in Celle had gained a blue-violet tone after a rain shower.32  
The British movement, by contrast, appears to have been much less con-
cerned about these existential issues. In general, discussions in Britain were 
more fact-oriented and shied away from broad statements about the impact of 
nuclear weapons. Instead, they emphasized the horrors of the situation: “the 
children playing hide-and-seek in Virginia, the Ukraine, Westphalia and War-
wickshire will suddenly find there is no place to hide.”33 They also stressed the 
                                                 
28  “Die Erben der Erde,” Aachener Nachrichten, April 6, 1954. For Britain, cf. Frank Parkin, 
Middle Class Radicalism. The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarma-
ment (Manchester, 1968), pp. 60-77. 
29  Cf. Tomorrow’s Children [c. 1960]: Modern Record Centre [MRC], University of War-
wick, MSS.181/4 and the memorandum about the exhibition “Atom – Fluch oder Segen,” 
Frankfurt/Main, Römerhallen [n.d., November 1958]: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie 
[AdsD], Bonn, 2/PVAM000027. 
30  Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1957, p. 362; Emnid-Informationen 8 (1956), no. 43, p. 
7. 
31  “Erhöhte Radioaktivität des Regens in Bayern,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, June 26, 1956; “Bedro-
hen Atomstrahlen Deutschland?,” Die Welt, June 26, 1956; “Radioaktiver Regen,” Indus-
triekurier, June 28,1956 and “Luftradioaktivität über Hamburg hat sich verzehnfacht,” 
Hamburger Abendblatt, July 5,1956. For reactions in the population, cf. the files in the 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BAK] B 138/100 (2). 
32  General-Anzeiger (Bonn), July 7, 1956. 
33  CND Bulletin, June 1958, p. 1 and CND Bulletin, May 1959, p. 3: MRC MSS.181/4. 
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importance of “public education” about the dangers of radioactive fall-out. 
Like most of their West German counterparts, however, British protesters 
maintained the link between radioactivity and nuclear tests rather than widen-
ing discussions to encompass radioactivity in general.34 
During the test moratorium which the United States and the Soviet Union 
observed from 1958 onwards, concern about the dangers of nuclear tests was 
voiced more rarely. When the Soviet Union started a new test series for a mas-
sive 60 MT bomb in autumn 1961, shortly after the building of the Berlin Wall, 
pictures of nuclear apocalypse again came to be connected to the issue of nu-
clear tests. For one West German observer, the device became “a horseman of 
the apocalypse … frightening, incalculable, threatening everyone in the same 
way, the non-guilty like the perpetrator, the unborn much more than the 
born.”35 Other papers feared a “world-wide Hiroshima” and calculated damages 
up to the year 4,962.36 
During and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, discussions in both movements 
about the dangers of nuclear weapons tests became less salient. With the be-
ginning of superpower détente and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the dangers of 
nuclear weapons seemed to have been tamed: “the atom” came to be linked less 
to life-threatening dangers. In West Germany, a new and younger generation of 
protesters emerged within the movements, so that war experiences receded into 
the background and new issues, such as the Vietnam War, which were not 
directly connected with the dangers of nuclear energy came to the forefront. 
However, some older activists, most notably the physicist Karl Bechert and the 
Munich-based Catholic writer Carl Amery, took the apocalyptic images with 
them and injected them into the public discourse of the environmental move-
ments of the 1970s and 1980s.37 In Britain, by contrast, those who had framed 
the discourses of the 1950s and early 1960s were too old to take part in the later 
discussions about nuclear energy. This may at least partly explain the weakness 
of the more recent British environmental movement. 
The images which emerged in both countries in the mid-1950s to describe 
the dangers of nuclear weapons remained characteristic within the discourses in 
both movements until the early 1960s, if not until the 1970s and 1980s. While 
the immediate war experiences moved slowly to the back of people’s memories 
and the dangers coming from the Cold War seemed to be less immediate, the 
dangers of nuclear weapons came into sharp relief. West Germans, in particu-
                                                 
34  Cf., for example, Stephen Siteman, “The Dangers of Radiation,” Peace News, August 23, 
1957, p. 7. 
35  “Die tödliche Drohung,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 26, 1961. The German weather 
service was now also instructed by the government to give air radioactivity levels in their 
forecasts: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, November 29, 
1961. 
36  “Atomschwaden über Deutschland,” Der Spiegel, 48, 1961. 
37  On Amery, cf. the interview in Goodbody (ed.), The Culture of German Environmentalism; 
on Bechert, see Radkau, Aufstieg und Krise, pp. 435ff. 
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lar, highlighted the themes of annihilation and chaos in the case of a Third 
World War.38 
This imagery had important roots in the popular fascination with “the atom” 
since the beginning of the twentieth century. But it would be too simplistic to 
draw a direct line from the many apocalyptic voices of the 1920s and 1930s to 
the discussions of the 1950s and 1960s.39 In both countries, fascination and fear 
had stood side by side from the beginning of discussions; only the balance 
between the two shifted. The language which was used from then on to de-
scribe the dangers of nuclear weapons had first emerged after the Second 
World War to describe the threats coming from atomic bombs in the late 1940s. 
From its inception in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the discourse about the 
dangers of nuclear energy was connected to its military rather than its civilian 
uses. It only gradually moved toward a more general concern with disarma-
ment. In the Federal Republic, and to a lesser degree in Great Britain, the mili-
tary uses of nuclear energy therefore came to be connected with the memory of 
the bombings of the Second World War.40 This memory was not restricted to 
West Germany, but can be found with a similar salience in British publications, 
albeit with a different resonance. While these memories allow a glimpse into 
catastrophic experiences in Germany, they also point to personal continuities 
between the protesters of the late 1950s and 1960s and participants in the Brit-
ish campaigns against night bombing during the Second World War.41 
Throughout the period, most British protesters, in contrast to their West Ger-
man counterparts, voiced their concerns in terms of international politics, rather 
than immediate death and destruction.42 
From the late 1950s onwards, the military uses of nuclear energy came to be 
connected with the awareness of the dangers of testing in West Germany. It 
                                                 
38  “Das Menetekel der Atombombe,” Die Zeit, April 1, 1954. Cf. also the report, “Frankfurter 
Delegation in Japan,” [n.d., c. 1958]: AdsD, DGB Archives, Abteilung Organisation, 
24/2217. On the very similar reception in Britain, cf. Driver, The Disarmers, pp. 27-28. On 
the worries of the British government about public opinion, cf. ‘Memorandum on Fall-out 
from the Minister of Defence, December 9, 1954: National Archives, London [NA] CAB 
128/72, C(54). 
39  This is the interpretation offered by Kirk Willis, “The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 
1895-1939,” Journal of British Studies 34 (1995), pp. 59-89. 
40  Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst. The Case of the West-German Opposition to Rearma-
ment and Nuclear Weapons,” in Hanna Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years. A Cultural His-
tory of West Germany, 1949-1969 (Princeton, 2001), pp. 376-408, here pp. 392-398. 
41  Cf., for example, “Jede Atombomben-Explosion ist ein Verbrechen an der Menschheit,” 
Das Gewissen, 1 (1956), p. 1; Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, 3. Wahlperiode, 
Stenografische Berichte, vol. 40, March 25, 1958, p. 1087B; Reimar Lenz, Die Atomrüs-
tung und der Intellektuelle (Berlin, 1958), p. 38. For Britain cf. “Hiroshima, Belsen – and 
Berlin. Have we still learned nothing,” Peace News, August 4, 1961, p.1; and Harry Elmer 
Barnes, “The coming of World War II,” Peace News, November 10, 1961, pp. 6-8; Cf. Ed-
ward Owen, “Dresden – a step towards megadeath,” Peace News May 31, 1963, p. 6. Cf. 
also Peace News, April 24, 1959, p. 1. 
42  Cf. Taylor, Against the Bomb, pp. 5-41. 
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was only then that Hiroshima emerged as synonym for man-made apocalypse.43 
As memories of the bombing war receded, Robert Jungk, in particular, stylized 
Hiroshima’s and Nagasaki’s victims as images of the future of atomic warfare. 
Particularly in West Germany, Jungk’s claim that now, in contrast with the 
Holocaust, no-one could claim ignorance of this “creeping suicide of man-
kind,” resonated especially strongly.44 The appeals of the survivor of the Na-
tional Socialist regime that no one should “survive as accidentally as we did” 
resonated widely in the British and West German public.45 All these themes 
gained in importance in the late 1950s when the issue of dangerous nuclear 
fall-out was re-connected to the debates about defense policy at the time. 
In West Germany, then, discussions about environmental dangers served to 
externalize experiences and fears of destruction in a period of heightened Cold 
War tensions. We can often find comparisons with the Black Death of the Mid-
dle Ages, which had been “a plague caused by humans … which does not 
know any borders once it is let loose by criminals or fools.”46 While Hiroshima 
had already become a place of memory in Britain, this place was still taken by 
the experience of World War II in West Germany. A British exhibition on the 
dangers of nuclear weapons had the title, “No place to hide,” following David 
Bradley’s 1948 novel, which was directly concerned with the effects of the 
bombing of Hiroshima. When the exhibition came to West Germany, the title 
of the German exhibition was translated to “Keiner kommt davon” (“No one 
can escape”), after a novel by Hans Hellmut Kirst on the Second World War 
experience.47  
Despite the differences in World War experiences, we can observe in both 
countries an emphasis on the dangers of an attack by stealth, a discussion 
whose continuities went back to the stealth bomber scares in Britain and Ger-
many during the 1920s and 1930s.48 The radioactive particles which “tests had 
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thrown into the air” could hit the earth in the forms of “rain, radioactive, as 
dew, radioactive, as fog, dust or snow, all radioactive. No human being could 
be sure that it did not affect him.”49 This was seen as particularly dangerous 
because the “atomic cloud” was not different from the other air; it was just “a 
radioactively marked body of air,” one thousandth of which would be enough 
to poison humankind.50 
Scientists played a crucial role in providing the movements and their publics 
with knowledge. This knowledge was transmitted across borders.51 Similar 
themes were discussed in Britain, West Germany and elsewhere. When Linus 
Pauling warned, for example, that “every nuclear test kills” and would lead to 
genetic defects, this was picked up by both movements.52 While the manifesto 
of the Mainau Conference of Nobel Prize winners in the summer of 1955 had 
been an endeavour without wider repercussions in other countries, the mani-
festo issued by the philosopher Bertrand Russell and the physicist Albert Ein-
stein in late 1954 reached a global audience. Apart from the authors, the docu-
ment was signed by Max Born, Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Linus Pauling, 
bridging the democratic-communist divide. 53 The manifesto called for the 
overcoming of the East-West-conflict and for a conference of scientists to 
discuss possible ways of controlling nuclear energy.54 Beginning in the summer 
of 1957, scientists had such a transnational forum. After plans to hold the con-
ference in India fell through, Cyrus Eaton, a wealthy Canadian industrialist, 
offered his estate in Pugwash, Nova Scotia as a venue. In July 1957, the first 
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conference of what was to be called the “Pugwash Movement” met to discuss 
the hazards of atomic energy, the control of nuclear weapons, and the social 
responsibility of scientists. Its annual conferences were widely publicized be-
yond the immediate confines of the scientific community and the information 
discussed in them was important for informing the wider population about the 
dangers of nuclear weapons.55 At these conferences, scientists developed an 
ideal that stressed the apolitical and non-partisan nature of scientific research, 
presenting it as a bridge that would lessen tensions between East and West.56 
Similarly, the theologian and missionary Albert Schweitzer became, with his 
pamphlet “Respect for Life” (“Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben”), another important 
transnational point of reference for the British and West German protests 
against nuclear weapons from 1957 onward and an icon of both movements 
with a “universal, magic appeal.”57 Here was a good German who issued dire 
warnings about the biological dangers of radioactivity.58 
These ideals of rational scientists who worked for international understand-
ing fell on particularly fertile ground in West Germany. While British scientists 
saw their role primarily as sources of knowledge, West German scientists, fol-
lowing particularly German scientific traditions, assumed a role as moral moni-
tors. While physicists such as P. M. S. Blackett and John D. Bernal, biologists 
like Antoinette Pirie and the mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell 
were important intellectuals for the British campaign, and while they probably 
published more about the dangers of radioactivity than their German counter-
parts, they did not play as distinct a role as West German scientists. Apart from 
Bertrand Russell, they did not assume a role as wise mandarins.59 This had to 
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do with the importance of intellectuals in German public culture and the high 
esteem in which Germans held the particular scientists who became involved. 
The German scientists, most of whom had been active during the National 
Socialist regime, used their activities to refashion their social image as intellec-
tuals above politics, yet endowed with special political insights. They intended 
this to be a counterpoint to the history of physics and the natural sciences dur-
ing the National Socialist regime, which, with its technocratic and pragmatic 
approach, seemed to have pushed their educational and cultural value to the 
sidelines of the profession.60 West German scientists thus sought to rescue the 
tradition of political influence that had characterized German physicists since 
the late nineteenth century. Particularly those scientists involved in the several 
appeals maintained a philosophical and culturally pessimistic outlook within 
their research.61 
All these elements crystallized when eighteen scientists, amongst them 
many Nobel Prize winners, issued the “Göttingen Manifesto” in April 1957, 
which criticized Adenauer’s comparison of nuclear artillery with conventional 
weapons and sparked the first wide-scale anti-nuclear weapons protests in the 
Federal Republic.62 Here, they presented themselves as passive resisters, as a 
moral voice directed towards immoral politics. With their refusal to cooperate 
in the development of military nuclear weapons and their parallel endorsement 
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, they suggested that these two areas 
could be clearly separated. In other statements, they sought to present this as 
the continuation of the good German tradition that had characterized their 
actions during the National Socialist regime: unlike their British and American 
colleagues, they had not been corrupted through working for the government. 
Robert Jungk popularized this interpretation in his book, Brighter than a Thou-
sand Suns.63 These efforts to reconstitute the German-educated bourgeoisie 
resonated widely within German post-war and post-National Socialist society. 
They met with the efforts of the Social Democratic Party in the campaign to 
win over a more substantial part of the middle-class constituency.  
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Another factor gave the position of West German scientists a peculiar shape. 
Much more than in Britain, the peaceful use of atomic energy was regarded 
within the movements as a national task which would help Germany to rejoin 
the community of nations peacefully.64 The supranational spirit of science en-
abled the scientists to find a language which transcended national boundaries.65 
This “vision of a humanitarian bond between science and society for the public 
good” dominated West German public discourse both within and outside the 
movements until the early 1960s. 66 The fact that some West German scientists 
agreed with Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and others, only under-
lines this argument.67 Hamburg Professor Pascual Jordan, one of the founders 
of quantum mechanics, for instance, had started to adopt a more technocratic 
and less philosophical style of research in the Third Reich.68  
The Debates about the “Peaceful Atom” 
While the debates highlighted the dangers related to the military uses of nuclear 
energy, most supporters of the British and West German anti-nuclear weapons 
movements did not extend their skepticism to the civilian use of “the atom.” 
Most discussions in both countries departed from an analysis of the present as 
an “atomic age” which commentators regarded as both threat and challenge.69 
The SPD’s Campaign even had a journal called Atomic Age (Atomzeitalter), 
which served not primarily to warn the population of the dangers of nuclear 
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energy, but to introduce it to a rational perspective on these matters.70 The 
discussions about the peaceful use of nuclear energy thus usually followed the 
binary code of “curse” and “blessing.”71 Rather than interpreting this as a spe-
cific hallmark of German nationalism, as Peter Fritzsche argues in his discus-
sion of aviation in Germany’s popular imagination in the 1930s,72 a comparison 
with Britain suggests that public ambivalence towards technological innova-
tions was neither in the 1950s nor earlier a specifically German phenomenon.73 
The theme of “curse” and “blessing” was based on the essential distinction be-
tween “peaceful” and “military” use of “the atom.” This distinction dates back 
to the immediate post-war period and the discussions about how to maintain the 
monopoly of nuclear weapons that the United States held at the time. In an 
article published in German, for instance, the philosopher Bertrand Russell 
concluded that the civilian use of atomic energy could bring a new age if a 
world government with control over nuclear weapons were constructed.74 It is a 
sign of the ambivalent character of these years of transition that the themes 
often overlapped. A West German psychological journal highlighted this spirit 
of the age from a Freudian perspective: apart from feelings of fear, human 
beings also possessed an archaic wish for destruction. Therefore, the journal 
concluded, “human beings subconsciously enjoy thinking of the unimaginable 
power of the Bomb.”75 While this analysis throws West German post-catastro-
phic society into sharp relief, there is a more obvious explanation for the am-
bivalent character of the period. It lies in the declining strength of cultural pes-
simism and in the rise and final dominance of a more empirical self-
observation of society, which manifested itself in a veritable euphoria for de-
mocratic planning.76 
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It is against this background that a veritable “atomic euphoria” began to 
push the fears of nuclear war and radiation from nuclear weapons to the mar-
gins of public discussions from the mid-1950s onwards.77 There was agreement 
that “the atom” had, for better or for worse, become the hallmark of a new pe-
riod in human history.78 While enthusiasm was confined to those circles of the 
Labour Party who opposed CND,79 the increasing focus on foreign and defense 
policy rather than nuclear tests within the movements explains why there were 
so few discussions about the dangers as well as the advantages of nuclear en-
ergy within the British movement.  
The majority in both movements who agreed with the distinction of “peace-
ful” vs. “military” uses and with the specific conceptions of modernity and 
progress regarded the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a way to overcome the 
legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War. This was not a product of 
American propaganda, nor did it push the fear of nuclear weapons aside.80 It 
was intimately related to very specific expectations of progress and of the fu-
ture. Nuclear energy was, in this context, not merely a source of energy but a 
symbol for technological developments and opportunities for the nation more 
generally.81 While the general public discourses in both countries came, from 
the 1950s onwards, to be increasingly euphoric about the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, the skeptical and optimistic interpretations continued to sit side 
by side within the British and West German movements against nuclear weap-
ons. It is the emphasis on planning in the discourses in both movements that 
provides the crucial link to the almost euphoric assessments of the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy in both countries amongst the majority of the move-
ments’ vocal members. It places the movements squarely among the assess-
ments of technological modernity and discussions about progress through plan-
ning in both countries at the time.82 While the military use of “the atom” would 
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result in the impossibility of all planning, using nuclear energy peacefully 
could contribute to the more rational ordering of societies and thus to the ef-
forts to overcome the legacies of war and destruction. This emphasis on the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy was also crucially linked to the changing Cold 
War climate of détente. The proponents of this view did not regard arms and 
military developments as the most important area of battle between East and 
West, but emphasized the areas of technology and culture instead.83 This read-
ing goes against interpretations which emphasize that activists did not want to 
be implicated in the contemporary society, an aspect that has also been re-
garded as characteristic of later environmental movements.84  
The distinction between peaceful and military uses of “the atom” was espe-
cially welcome on the political left, as it combined thinking about progress 
with utopianism. Here, it was linked to the conviction that the future could be 
designed and planned.85 Although the precise ideas of planning within the 
movements and between the countries differed, we can find similar arguments 
in Britain and West Germany:86 while the military use of nuclear energy would 
make such planning impossible, its peaceful use would allow planning for bet-
ter a society. Historians usually situate this process only in the period after the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty in 1963, but, as this analysis has made clear, it already 
can be found in the period directly after the Geneva Summit.87 It is also striking 
that nuclear enthusiasm in the West German movement was much stronger 
than in the British one.  
Thus, atomic euphoria in West Germany was particularly pronounced in the 
SPD, which explains the coexistence of skepticism and enthusiasm about “the 
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atom” in the SPD’s Campaign against Atomic Death.88 Many voices from 
within the party and the movement regarded nuclear energy as important means 
to deal with the rapid growth of world population and to enable developing 
nations’ economic progress by allowing them to partake in the energetic poten-
tial of “the atom.”89 The United States was seen as a leader in this field: it had 
already managed to tame the atom for peaceful uses so that the “future had 
already begun” there, as Robert Jungk, himself very active in the international 
anti-nuclear weapons campaigns, observed.90 This positive image of the 
“peaceful atom” also had a particular resonance amongst those within the West 
German movement and within West German society more generally who did 
not agree with the emphasis on planning. Advocating the civilian uses of ato-
mic energy could serve as a symbol for the peaceful intentions of the young 
Federal Republic. 
Due to the World War and Cold War experiences, movement discussions in 
both countries focused on the dangers of nuclear energy, primarily along mili-
tary lines. There were only localized debates about the building of nuclear 
reactors in Germany, which remained largely unopposed on a national level.91 
In Britain, the release of fission products from the plutonium plant Calder Hall, 
Windscale, on 8 October 1957 was hardly noticed in the British population and 
in the protest movement: the government kept most of the details secret, thus 
preventing communication about the problem.92 A review article in one of the 
British movement’s journals merely mentioned „a recent mishap at the Wind-
scale Plutonium Factory,” but did not take it as an opportunity to elaborate on 
the dangers of the civilian uses of nuclear energy.93 
Yet the evidence of atomic euphoria and limited concern about the civilian 
uses of nuclear energy should not be taken as evidence for the end of concern 
about nuclear weapons or for a lack of awareness of the dangers connected 
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with nuclear energy. In 1957, West German opinion polls found that 60% of 
the population was worried about health dangers to future generations. In 1961, 
86% thought that way.94 While two-thirds of West German adults had con-
nected nuclear energy with “bombs, war, annihilation” in a 1955 poll, only 8% 
of those polled in 1958 favoured atomic energy, with 17% fearing that its use 
could lead to “atomic war.”95 The British population appears to have been 
equally aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons, albeit less pronouncedly so.96 
Even after 1960, Robert Jungk continued to publish about the dangers of nu-
clear weapons, as did Karl Bechert. Similarly, the Munich Committee for Nu-
clear Disarmament alerted its members and the public to the dangers of nuclear 
weapons, although it still primarily focused on the dangers of nuclear weapons, 
rather than nuclear energy in general. Günther Schwab, for example, in his 
book Dancing with the Devil (Tanz mit dem Teufel) drew an apocalyptic picture 
of the uses of atomic energy. The book, which tells the story of “Satan” who 
sets out to poison the earth, had gone through ten editions by 1972. In one 
scene, the problems of atomic radiation in the event of an explosion in a nu-
clear power plant are discussed. This explosion would lead to a “death-
inducing radiation up to 80 kilometres away.”97 
The main groups who did not fall for the “atomic euphoria” of the time were 
those on the margins of the West German movement who maintained a cultural 
pessimism against technology more generally. Politically, they had a national-
neutralist standpoint.98 Those skeptical of both the military and peaceful uses of 
atomic energy centered around the Kampfbund gegen Atomschäden, the “Fight-
ing League against Atomic Damages,” which was affiliated with the SPD-run 
Campaign and the Munich-centered “Committee against Nuclear Armaments.” 
It campaigned against “atomic dangers” as dangers “caused by civilisation,” 
thus using a rather conservative rhetoric.99 The League had been founded in 
July 1956 by the head physician of the Detmold hospital, Dr. Bodo Manstein, 
who was a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). It was joined by sev-
eral veteran organizations as well as by the movement for the Health of the 
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German People (Deutsche Volksgesundheitsbewegung).100 Its publications em-
phasized the humanitarian and moral aspects of the use of atomic energy. Its 
rhetoric had Christian overtones. Humans had played tricks against nature, 
which would strike back.101 Through its journal, The Conscience (Das Gewis-
sen), with its subtitle, “Organ for fighting atomic misuse and atomic damages,” 
the League reached a wider middle-class audience, especially the one centered 
around the Munich Committee.102 In the journal, we can find ideas of a peace-
ful warriorhood, of righteousness and of disease, reminiscent of National So-
cialist language.103 “Atomic plague” and “atomic epidemic” were its central 
terms. The self-defined task of the League was to “shake all human beings until 
they are awake … before the earth with which they have been entrusted has 
become a crater and a field of epidemics of a lunatic suicidal atomic war.”104 
Others who warned of the dangers of the peaceful uses of atomic energy were, 
by contrast, less concerned about environmental hazards, but, rather, primarily 
worried about a secret atomic armament of the Federal Republic. They argued 
that the British example showed that military and civilian uses could not be 
clearly separated.105 
Conclusion 
Cold War developments, experiences of World War II and fears of military 
applications left a marked imprint on the discussions about nuclear energy 
within the anti-nuclear weapons movements in both countries. As the social 
movements communicated these dangers to their respective societies, these 
findings have implications for our interpretations of the environmental aware-
ness of the British and West German populations in general. Awareness of the 
dangers of radioactivity was strong throughout the period, but the movements’ 
discourses focused primarily on military uses. It was in this context that a dis-
cussion about the peaceful uses of “the atom” could emerge that did not push 
the awareness of dangers aside, but merely reduced its salience. This was par-
ticularly the case after the danger of fall-out from tests seemed to have been 
averted through the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. Only those who did not 
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accept the distinction between “peaceful” and “military” nuclear energy and 
those who did not agree with the notion of progress connected with these 
peaceful uses were opposed to all kinds of use of nuclear energy. 
Both debates were affected crucially by the changing parameters of the Cold 
War, which moved from military confrontation to accommodation during this 
period. The specific national features of the debates cannot be ignored, how-
ever. In West Germany, both fear and enthusiasm were much more pronounced 
than in Britain throughout these years. This had to do with the much greater 
impact that the Cold War left on West German society. In addition, West Ger-
many’s discussions were framed crucially by the experiences of chaos and 
destruction during the Second World War, which slowly receded during this 
period,106 and by the attempts to define an identity for the new West German 
state. Both endowed the West German movement with an apocalyptic rhetoric 
that it bequeathed to its successors in the 1970s and 1980s. Discussions about 
planning and rationality underlay these self-observations of society in both 
countries. They changed from a predominantly existentialist mode to a more 
empirical-pragmatic one that started to dominate discussions from the early 
1960s onwards. Although no large-scale protests against nuclear energy 
emerged in either country during this period, there was clearly an awareness of 
the dangers – an awareness that played a crucial role for the environmental 
movements of the 1970s, even though they operated within different social, 
political and international contexts.107 We cannot understand the emergence of 
wide-scale environmental protest in the 1970s and 1980s without examining 
the first period of awareness in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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